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THE DEGREE OF CANADIAN OWNERSHIP:
AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY?
A. R. A. SCACE
I
Since the American Revolution in 1774, concern about the extent
and degree of Canadian subservience to the United States has been
a recurrent and vocal theme in Canadian politics. It has covered the
whole social and economic spectrum from cultural annihilation to
incorporation as the fifty-first state of the union. Indeed, American
economic influence was a motivating factor in the 1867 Confederation
between Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.' The two
most recent manifestations are to be found in the proposed legis-
lation altering the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act,
the Foreign Insurance Companies Act, the Trust Companies Act
and the Loan Companies Act2 and the amendments to the Canadian
Income Tax Act favouring a degree of Canadian ownership in the
equity shares of public and private corporations.3 The latter is the
subject of this presentation.
It is indisputable that the investment of long term foreign capital
has been a major determinant of Canada's economic growth. Historic-
ally, the two main sources have been Western Europe and the United
States. However, in the years since 1945, the flow from the United
States as a percentage of the total has reached dramatic proportions
as illustrated by the following table.4
* Mr. Scace is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School. He is a
graduate of the University of Toronto, received his Master of Arts degree
from Harvard University, and was a Rhodes Scholar in Jurisprudence at
Oxford University.
1 O'Connor, W. F., Report on the B.N.A. Act, p. 53.
2 The House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-123, Second Session, Twenty-
Sixth Parliament, 13 Elizabeth IT, 1964.
3 Statutes of Canada, 1963, C-21, s. 28(1); 1964, c. 13, s. 25(1)-(4).
4 Aitken, Deutsch, Mackintosh, Barber, Lamontagne, Brecher and Forsey,
The American Economic Impact on Canada, p. 157.
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NON-RESIDENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENT IN CANADA
1900-1957 ($000,000)
Year U.S. U.K. Total U.S. % U.K. %
1900 ........................ 68 1,050 1,232 14 85
1914 ....................... 881 2,778 3,837 23 72
1918 ........................ 1,630 2,729 4,536 36 60
1926 ....................... 3,196 2,637 6,003 53 44
1930 ........................ 4,660 2,766 7,614 61 36
1939 ....................... 4,151 2,476 5,913 60 36
1945 ....................... 4,990 1,750 7,092 70 25
1949 ..................... 5,906 1,717 7,963 74 22
1953 ........................ 8,870 2,008 11,461 77 18
1954 ..................... 9,692 2,181 12,577 77 17
1955 ........................ 10,289 2,347 13,468 77 17
1956 ..... 11,651 2,675 15,400 76 17
1957 ..... 13,035 2,910 17,200 76 17
It is readily seen that in the first twelve post-war years, foreign
investment has more than doubled and the United States has been
the source of three-quarters of that amount. In addition, much of
this has been in the form of direct as opposed to portfolio investment.5
One authority estimates that of the total direct foreign investment,
83 per cent is of American origin.6 Furthermore, much of it has been
centered in the so called "growth" areas of our economy. As noted by
the Minister of Finance in 1963
The latest figures prepared by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics show
that in 1959, 57 per cent of our manufacturing industry, 75 per cent of
our petroleum and natural gas industry and 61 per cent of other mining
and smelting in this country were controlled by non-residents. Anyone
familiar with the financial pages of our newspapers can hardly be un-
aware of the extent to which these figures have undoubtedly increased
since that date ... 7
There seems to be no reason for attacking the validity of these statis-
tics. Rather, they represent a fact of Canadian economic life. Whether
they are a necessary evil or, indeed, whether they are an evil will be
canvassed below. But first, I plan to discuss the decision to amend the
Income Tax Act.
The decision itself came as no surprise to those who had been
following the career of Mr. Walter Gordon. In the final report of the
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, he adverted to
the changes which were to come some six years later:
we believe the main objectives of Canadians in this matter should be:
first, to see a larger share of foreign capital invested in the forms of
bonds and mortgages, which do not involve control of large sectors of
the economy; secondly, to see that the part of foreign investment which
is invested in the resource and manufacturing industries is associated in
some degree with Canadian capital and Canadian interests .... 8
In a footnote it was stated that they had something in the order of
20 to 25 per cent in mind. Again in 1961, Mr. Gordon called for similar
legislation.
s In this paper, direct investment refers to investment by concerns which
are effectively controlled by non-residents.
6 Aitken, Deutsch et al., op. cit., p. 102.
7 Debates House of Commons, Canada, 1963 volume 2, p. 1000.
8 Royal dommission on Canada's Economic Prospects, final report, p. 392.
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This position cannot be analysed scientifically or proved absolutely. But
the fact that a judgment or belief is arrived at in part intuitively does
not necessarily make it any the less true. Certainly many of our citizens
are unhappy to see Canada as a nation losing a large measure of econo-
mic independence more or less by default. Positive action is needed if we
are to reverse this trend.9
II
With the advent of the Liberal administration, these views were
brought to partial fruition. In contrast to Bill C-123,10 nothing was
made mandatory but by section 139A, a new concept was added to
Canadian tax jurisprudence.
(1) For the purposes of this Act a corporation has a degree of Canadian
ownership in a taxation year if throughout the sixty-day period im-
mediately preceding that year (or if the corporation did not have a
preceeding taxation year, throughout the sixty-day period commenc-
ing on the first day of the year)
(a) The corporation complied with the following conditions
(i) The corporation was resident in Canada
(ii) either
(A) not less than 25% of the issued shares having full voting
rights under all circumstances were owned by one or
more individuals resident in Canada, one or more cor-
porations controlled in Canada or a combination thereof,
or
(B) the shares of the corporation having full voting rights
under all circumstances were listed on a prescribed stock
exchange in Canada, and it is established in prescribed
manner that no one non-resident shareholder of the cor-
poration owned more than 75% of the shares of the
corporation, having full voting rights under all circum-
stances, alone or in combination with any other person
related to him at any time within the period within the
meaning of subsection (5a) or (5b) of section 139, and
(i1i) where the year commences after December 31, 1964, the num-
ber of directors who were resident in Canada was not less
than 25% of the total number of directors of the corporation;
or
(b) the corporation complied with the conditions specified in sub-
paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (a) and was a subsidiary
wholly owned corporation subsidiary to a corporation that
throughout the sixty-day period complied with the conditions
specified in paragraph (a)
(2) For the purposes of this section,
(a) a corporation is controlled in Canada at a particular time if at
that time the corporation is resident in Canada and more than
50% of its issued shares having full voting rights under all cir-
cumstances are owned by one or more individuals resident in
Canada one or more corporations controlled in Canada or a com-
bination thereof;
(b) a non-resident person who has a right under a contract in equity
or otherwise either immediately or in the future and either abso-
9 Gordon, W. L., Troubled Canada, The Need for New Domestic PoNcies,
p. 97.
10 Supra, footnote 2.
11 Statutes of Canada, 1963, c. 21, s. 28(1).
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lutely or contingently, to, or to acquire, shares in a corporation
shall be deemed to own those shares and any other person who
actually owns the shares in respect of which the non-resident
person has such a right shall be deemed not to own those shares;
(c) where shares are owned by a trustee resident in Canada the
shares shall be deemed not to be owned by a person resident in
Canada unless it is established that each beneficiary under the
trust is an individual resident in Canada; and
(d) where, during any relevant sixty-day period referred to in sub-
section (1), a director of a corporation who is resident in Canada
dies and within 60 days thereafter another person who is resident
in Canada is appointed or elected to be a director of the corpora-
tion, such other person shall be deemed to have become such a
director immediately upon the death of the deceased director.
There were, of course, rewards for any corporation which achieved
this degree of Canadian equity participation.12 It was entitled to claim
a capital cost allowance of 50% per annum, computed on a straight-
line basis on the purchase price of new machinery and equipment, 13
and the withholding tax on dividends paid to non-residents was re-
duced to 10%14 instead of a normal rate of 15%.5
Some commentators have supported the amendment on the ground
that it was merely a trial balloon designed to test both Canadian and
American reactions. If this be so, it is an extraordinary illustration
of an Irresponsible government acting with complete disregard for its
citizens in general and its tax payers in particular. In my opinion, the
amendment was puerile in the -extreme. For a policy that had been
so long in the making, one might have expected the government to
choose a less ingenuous draftsman. In any event, the legislation was
no sooner promulgated than it was circumvented. To take a purely
fictitious example, let us suppose the existence of a Canadian corpora-
tion which is the wholly owned subsidiary of an American parent with
the following capital structure.
Authorized
1,000 fully voting, redeemable preference shares, par value$5.00 ......................................................................................................................................... $5,000.00
2,000 comm on shares, par value $1.00 ............................................................ 2,000.00
T otal ...................................................................................................................................................... $7,000.00
Issued
200 preference shares ......................................................................................................... $1,000.00
1,000 com m on shares ............................................................................................................ 1,000 00
T otal ...................................................................................................................................................... $2,000.00
It is to be noted that there are 1,200 issued shares with full voting
rights. Since section 139A made no reference to the value of the
Canadian held shares, compliance could be achieved by the issue of
400 common treasury shares.' 6 If there were no treasury shares, sup-
plementary letters patent increasing the authorized capital would
12 Gilmour, A. W., Income Tax Handbook, 1963-4, p. 551.
13 Income Tax Regulations, 1100 (1) (n).
14 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 106(Ca) (o).
15 Prior to the 1964 amendments, the differential was greater as the
normal rate was 20%.16 There would then be 1,600 issued shares.
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solve the problem.'7 The shares would, however, have to be owned
either by Canadian residents or a corporation controlled in Canada.
This was done in most cases by one of two methods; either
(a) the Canadian subsidiary's solicitors would incorporate a com-
pany, the shares of which were all owned by the partners for
the sole purpose of holding the qualifying shares, 8 or
(b) the shares would be held by Canadian directors of the Com-
pany in trust for Canadian employees. Since the directors
could be dismissed at the will of the American parent, effec-
tive control of the shares was never lost. In addition, the
employee beneficiaries by the terms of the trust were not
entitled to the shares in specie but only to a cash division
upon termination of their services.
Thus in either case the act had been followed, the company was resi-
dent in Canada, 25% of the shares were owned by Canadians and pre-
sumably 25% of the directors were Canadians.
II
It was all too easy, and consequently in 1964, section 139A was
amended in the following manner. 9 Subsection (1) (a) (ii) became
(ii) either
(A) not less than 25% of the issued and outstanding shares of the
corporation having full voting rights under all circumstances
were owned by one or more individuals resident in Canada, one
or more corporations controlled in Canada or a combination
thereof, and equity shares representing in the aggregate not
less than 25% of that part of the paid-up capital of the corpora-
tion that was represented by all the issued and outstanding equity
shares of the corporation were owned by one or more individuals
resident in Canada, one or more corporations controlled in
Canada, or a combination thereof, or
(B) a class or classes of shares of the corporation having full voting
rights under all circumstances were listed on a prescribed stock
exchange in Canada, and it is established in prescribed manner
that no one non-resident person and no one corporation that did
not comply with clause (A) of this subparagraph owned more
than 75% of the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation
having full voting rights under all circumstances, alone or in
combination with any other person related to such non-resident
person or such corporation at any time within the period within
the meaning of subsection (5a) or (5b) of section 139, and a
class or classes of equity shares of the corporation representing
in the aggregate not less than 50% of that part of the paid-up
capital of the corporation that was represented by all the issued
outstanding equity shares of the corporation were listed on a
prescribed stock exchange in Canada, and it is established in
prescribed manner that no one non-resident person and no one
corporation that did not comply with clause (A) of this subpara-
graph owned equity shares representing in the aggregate more
than 75% of that part of the paid-up capital of the corporation
that was represented by all the issued and outstanding equity
17 R.S.C. 1952, c. 53, s. 48, R.S.O. 1960, c. 71, s. 33.
18 Such persons would not be trustees within the terms of s. 139 A(1).
19 Statutes of Canada, 1964, c. 13, s. 25(1)-(4) or Stikeman, H. H., Income
Tax Act, Annotated, p. 416.
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shares of the corporation, alone or in combination with any
other person related to such non-resident person or such cor-
poration at any time within the period, within the meaning of
subsection (5a) or (5b) of section 139.
By subsection (2) (e), an equity share was defined to mean
(i) a share, other than a non-participating share, the owner of which
has, as owner thereof a right
(A) to a dividend, and
(B) to a part of the surplus of the corporation after repayment of
capital and payment of arrears of dividend, upon the redemption
of the share, a reduction of the capital of the corporation or
the winding up of the corporation, at least as great, in any
event, as the right of the owner of any other share, other than
a non-participating share, of the corporation, when the magni-
tude of the right in each case is expressed as a rate based on
the paid-up capital value of the share to which the right relates,
or
(ii) a share, other than a non-participating share, the owner of which
has, as owner thereof, a right
(A) to a dividend, after a dividend at a rate not in excess of 8% per
annum of the paid-up capital value of each share has been paid
to the owners of shares of a class other than the class to which
that share belongs, and
(B) to a part of the surplus of the corporation after repayment of
capital and payment of arrears of dividend, upon the redemption
of the share, a reduction of the capital of the corporation or the
winding up of the corporation, after a payment of a part of the
surplus at a rate not in excess of 10% of the paid-up capital
value of each share has been made to the owners of shares of a
class other than the class to which that share belongs, at least
as great, in any event, as the right of the owner of any other
share, other than a non-participating share of the corporation,
when the magnitude of the right in each case is expressed as a
rate based on the paid-up capital value of the share to which the
right relates;
Subsection (2) (f) defined a non-participating share as
a share the owner of which is not entitled to receive, as owner thereof,
any dividend other than a dividend, whether cumulative or not,
(i) at a fixed annual rate or amount, or
(ii) at an annual rate or amount, not in excess of a fixed annual rate
or amount;
and by subsection (2) (g)
"paid-up capital value," with reference to a share, means
(i) in the case of an unissued share that is deemed by paragraph (b) to
be issued and outstanding, the amount determined under clause (B)
of subparagraph Cviii) of that paragraph, and2
(ii) in any other case, an amount equal to the paid-up capital of the cor-
poration that is represented by the shares of the class to which that
share belongs divided by the number of shares of that class that are
in fact issued and outstanding; and
(B) where
(i) the paid-up capital of a corporation that is represented by all the
issued and outstanding equity shares of the corporation Is less than
20 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 139 A(2) (b).
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50% of the paid-up capital of the corporation that is represented by
all the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation other than
non-participating shares, or
(ii) a non-participating share of the corporation, the owner of which has,
as owner, a right to a dividend(a) at a fixed annual rate in excess of 8%, or(b) at an annual rate not in excess of a fixed maximum annual rate,
if the fixed maximum annual rate is in excess of 8%,
when the right to a dividend is expressed as a rate based on the
paid-up capital value of the share to which the right relates, is
issued and outstanding, the issued and outstanding equity shares of
the corporation shall be deemed not to be equity shares.
The 1964 amendment represents a much higher degree of sophis-
tication. But, again its purpose of "Canadianizing" American subsi-
diaries could be avoided by the manipulation of the Company's capital
structure. Briefly, to qualify under the new section 1.39A (1) (ii) (A),
Canadian resident must own (free of any rights of acquisition or
control in favour of a non-resident person)
(a) at least 25% (by number) of all fully voting shares outstand-
ing, and
(b) "equity shares" representing at least 25% of the aggregate
amount paid up on all outstanding "equity shares" of the
corporation.
The term "equity share" as defined above has a meaning quite differ-
ent from that which normal usage would give to it. Inter alia, it is
defined not to include a "non-participating share". "Non-participating
share" is in turn defined by section 139 (A) (2) (f) to mean a share
whose owner is not, as owner, entitled to receive any dividend other
than one which is at, or not in excess of, a fixed annual rate of 8% .
The solution is to establish a share having rights that fall within
these limits.
Returning to our hypothetical company, its capital could be
altered so as to achieve a degree of Canadian ownership as follows:
(1) redeem the 200 outstanding preference shares.
(2) by supplementary letters patent:
(a) convert the 1,000 issued and outstanding common shares
of the company into two classes of shares as follows:
(i) 1,000 class A shares, non-voting (unless
dividends thereon are in arrears); fully
participating on a winding up or other
dissolution or distribution of assets (pro
rata with other participating shares based
upon the relative amounts paid up there-
on); carrying a preferential cumulative
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dividend of 8% per annum but not entit-
led to any further dividend in any year;
non-redeemable; par value $1.5021 ....... $1,500.00
(ii) 1,000 common shares, par value $0.1022....... 100.00
Total Issued capital ............................................... $1,600.00.
(b) convert the 1,000 authorized but unissued common
shares, par value $1.00 into 10,000 common shares par
value $0.10. These would remain as unissued treasury
shares of the corporation.
(c) cancel the 800 unissued preference shares.
By placing 250 of the new common shares into the hands of the same
persons described with reference to the 1963 provisions, the position
would then be:
1. ".... not less than 25% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the corporation having full voting rights under all circum-
stances..." viz., the 1,000 common shares, and
2. "... . equity shares representing in the aggregate not less than
25% of that part of the paid-up capital of the corporation that
was represented by all the issued and outstanding equity
shares of the corporation . . ."' viz., $100.00 represented by
the 1,000 issued common shares.
Hence the Canadian resident share ownership provisions of section
139A (1) (ii) (A) would have been satisfied.23
In addition, it is to be noted that since both the new class A
shares and the new common shares of the company will be "common
shares" as defined in section 139 (1) (g) of the Act 24 and since there
will be no increase in the amount of paid-up capital of the company
after conversion, there will be no adverse income tax implications
arising from such conversion. Furthermore, the "conditional voting"
characteristics of the Class A shares offers further protection to the
position of the United States parent. By passing one year's dividend
on those shares, they could be made fully voting. This would give the
parent company a preponderant degree of voting control, thus enab-
ling it to carry out any corporate purpose which it thought desirable.
21 The class A shares are "non-participating shares" as defined since their
owner is limited to an annual dividend at a fixed rate-namely 8%--Section
139A(2) (f). These shares are therefore, by definition, not "equity shares -
Section 139A(2) (e).
22 The common shares are "equity shares" as defined and the amount
paid up on them-namely $100.00-represents the amount paid up on all the
issued and outstanding shares of the company other than "non-participating
shares".
23 This particular structure is not the only alternative. Numerous permu-
tations can be devised within the permissible limits.
24 "Common share" is a share the holder of which is not precluded upon
the reduction or redemption of the capital stock from participating In the
assets of the corporation beyond the amount paid up thereon plus a fixed
premium and a defined rate of dividend.
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A major problem with the structure outlined above is the diffi-
culty of servicing the parent company with adequate annual dividends.
Because the Class A shares are limited to an 8% annual dividend,
the total amount is of necessity limited. Of course, 75% of any divi-
dend declared on the common shares would also go to the parent, but
in most cases these would never be significant. However, for the
years 1964 and 1965, the problem could probably be met effectively
by having the subsidiary declare in 1964 and as of a record date,
that is before the date when the capital reorganization is effected,
an extra dividend sufficient to meet the parent's requirements in
1964 and 1965. If a "degree of Canadian ownership" was then ac-
quired subsequently, it would relate back to the whole of 196425 and
the extra dividend, if paid in 1964, would qualify for the lower with-
holding rate. An alternative and undoubtedly better method would be
to declare a stock dividend on the "non-participating shares". This is
possible since section 139A refers only to a dividend and section
139 (1) (k) states that a "dividend" does not include a stock dividend.
In this way, the parent's requirements could be effectively serviced
but it is to be admitted that the approach is slightly more speculative.
In my opinion, no other methods are available. If the subsidiary
loaned money to the parent, it would probably be considered a "deem-
ed dividend" under section 8 and if the loan did not bear a reasonable
rate of interest and remained outstanding for more than a year,
interest at the rate of 5% would be deemed to have been received
under section 19. Nor is the possibility of the subsidiary buying the
shares of its parent any more attractive. Under the Ontario Corpora-
tions Act26 it is expressly forbidden for a company to be a share-
holder of a company that is its holding company. Under the Dominion
Companies Act, it is not explicitly illegal but conservative opinion
deems it to be inadvisable.27 In any event, the proposed amendment to
the latter Act will soon resolve the matter so as to make such share-
holding a nullity.2 8
In conclusion, the writer submits that the capital structure as
outlined complies completely with section 139A (1) (a) (ii) (A). Never-
theless, in all likelihood, its useful life will be quite circumscribed.
The history of the legislation and of the government's continuing
policy in this regard renders it probable that new provisions will be
promulgated in 1965. Undoubtedly, they will be more stringent. All
gaps can be closed by a one sentence formulation such as: "all classes
of shares both in number ;nd value". Considerable speculation has
arisen as to why this had not been adopted. As noted previously, a
possible but unlikely reason is that the government has been testing
the response of both the American authorities and the American cor-
porations with Canadian subsidiaries. More plausible is the suggestion
25 This is so by virtue of the opening words of Section 139A.
26 R.S.O. 1960, c. 71, s. 94(1).
27 Fraser and Stewart, Company Law of Canada, p. 97.
28 The Senate of Canada, Bill S-22, s. 13.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
of sheer ineptitude. Nonetheless, it cannot be expected that this will
continue.
IV
With regard to section 139A (1) (a) (ii) (B) and the alternative of
listing on a prescribed stock exchange, the results have not been much
more encouraging. Theoretically, the section can be circumvented. The
requirements are:
1. a class of shares having full voting rights must be listed and
no one non-resident person or corporation must own more
than 75 % of such shares, and
2. a class of "equity" shares representing in the aggregate not
less than 50% of that part of the paid-up capital represented
by all the issued and outstanding "equity" shares must be
listed and no one non-resident person or corporation may own
more than 75% of that part of such paid-up capital.
The solution is to establish three classes of shares as follows:
Class A: voting common shares .................... ...... 1,000
Class B: non-voting common equity shares ....................... 1,000
Class C: non-participating shares ................ 1,000,000
The Class C shares would all be held by the American parent and
would not be listed. The Class B shares would be listed and 250 would
be held by Canadian residents. The Class A shares would be listed and
250 would be held by Canadian residents. Thus, both requirements
would have been met yet the parent company would retain control by
owning / of the voting shares and would also own the preponderant
portion of the paid-up capital.
Practically, the solution is of no utility since such shares would
not be listed by any stock exchange. In general, the exchanges' test
for listing is based on the breadth of distribution and such a capitali-
zation would not be recognized.
At the time of writing, only three corporations have issued new
securities. 29 In total, these represent an additional 3,550,000 shares
with an issue value of $71,625,000. The largest was the offering of
2,500,000 common shares at $24.00 per share by Union Carbide Can-
ada Limited.30 According to the most recent report, a number of
companies are considering new issues but to date, movement has been
extremely slow. There are a number of possible reasons for this ma-
laise all of which result from the insufficiency of the incentive.
The withholding tax differential is now only 5%.31 Therefore,
on every dollar of operating profit, there is an actual differential of
29 They are Kelsey Wheel Company Limited, Union Carbide Canada Lim-
ited and Weldwood Canada Limited.30 In point of fact, this was the largest share offering in Canadian history.
31 Supra, footnotes 14 and 15.
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2 % or 2 ¢l.32 From this must be subtracted the current 7-8% dis-
count between the exchange rates of the Canadian and American
dollar and the result is then approximately 2¢ on every dollar of
operating profit. If one assumes that the legal and stock exchange
costs of a public issue are approximately $100,000, a company must
have an operating profit in excess of $5,000,000 in the first year for
the withholding tax differential to act as an incentive. This of course
does not take into account the United States foreign tax credit which
further exacerbates the situation. Thereby, a United States corpora-
tion can credit against its United States tax the foreign taxes paid
directly by it as well as the foreign corporate taxes appropriate to
dividends received from its foreign subsidiaries. Such credit is limited
in amount to the United States tax (48%) 33 otherwise payable on
the foreign source income. Any excess is not creditable.34 However,
such limitation is not applied to each item of foreign income but
to the aggregate in a given foreign country, or, if an election is made,
with respect to the aggregate of all foreign income.35 Thus a corpora-
tion with world-wide interests might have to pay 56.8%36 on its
Canadian source-income but only 38% on its Swiss income. The ex-
cess credit on the Canadian income can then be used to reduce the
United States tax otherwise payable on the Swiss source income.
The net effect of the above is that a broadly based American cor-
poration with a considerable amount of low tax foreign income will
have little regard for the 5% withholding tax differential. To some
extent, this is less true with the advent of the post 1965 rate of 48%37
but the success or failure of Canadian policy should not be dependent
on fortuitous changes abroad. Pursuant thereto consideration might
be given to a graduated incentive scheme such as:
25% Canadian participation ...................................................................................... 10% rate
30% Canadian participation ....................................................................................... 5% rate
35% Canadian participation ......................... 0 rate
Or, a more effective "carrot" would be the complete elimination of
all withholding tax. This of course would still leave an excess credit
for the American parent but with rising taxes in hitherto low tax
32 Operating Profit .............................. $1.00
Corporate Taxes ........ 0.50
Net Profit ......... $0.50
15% withholding tax .................. 712
10% withholding tax .................. 50
net difference 2%¢
33 After 1965, the tax payable on taxable income over $25,000 is 48%. In
1964 and 1963, it was 50% and 52% respectively.
34 Canadian Tax Journal, vol. XI, No.1, p. 52.
35 United States Revenue Code, Sections 901-4 or C.C.H., Federal Tax
Guide (1) 1965, p. 656.
36 This calculation is based on a corporate rate of 52% plus a 10% with-
holding rate on the assumption that the corporation has complied with sec-
tion 139A.
37 Nor does the reasoning apply to a company whose sole subsidiary is
based in Canada.
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countries, the incentive might very well become important.38 In any
event, by Article VI.2 of the Canadian-United Kingdom Tax Agree-
ment, no withholding tax is payable on dividends from a wholly owned
Canadian subsidiary to a British parent.39 Since a treaty takes prece-
dence over domestic legislation, section 139A has no application to the
United Kingdom. However, the important point is that a precedent
exists for the abolition of the withholding tax and it is to be hoped
that such an alteration will be made.
With regard to the capital cost allowance provisions, a detailed
study of their application to a particular company would be beyond
the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the class covered is not
unduly broad and is premised on the fact that the company in ques-
tion will be undertaking a program of expansion within the short
term. If, however, the proceeds from the underwriting are used for
a dividend payout to the parent, then the subsidiary must have either
a strong current position or the ability to borrow extensively in the
bond market.4 0 In summary, it would seem that the current incentives
can only be attractive to the largest and most profitable American
subsidiaries. Yet these are the very companies which are best able
to generate internal capital and thus equalize the tax differential. One
must therefore draw the conclusion that section 139A (1) (a) (ii) (B)
is bound to be of rather limited utility unless the withholding tax is
decreased even further and a more liberal capital cost allowance
provided.
In addition, the actual wording of the section should be noted
with care, viz.,
"That no one non-resident person and no one corporation that did not
comply with clause (A) of this subparagraph owned more than 75% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation..."
The shareholders need not be Canadian; in point of fact, they
may be American. By means of regulation 3100 to the Income Tax
Act,41 machinery has been devised for establishing such facts, but
it still remains impossible for the Minister of National Revenue to
determine the matter categorically. Indeed, the sworn declaration
need only establish that the listed securities were held by a large
number of persons and that no one non-resident shareholder alone
or in combination held more than 75% of the shares. The net result
is that the Act may only force the American parent into the accep-
tance of a minority position rather than as intended, the acceptance
of a Canadian minority. Furthermore, regulation 3100 may constitute
an unwarranted invasion of the corporate structure and finances of
the parent company. The normal rule is that so long as a taxpayer
38 A feature of the present legislation is that Canada now receives the
tax rather than the United States Treasury.
39 Notice of termination of the Agreement was given by Canada in June,1964, effective January 1, 1965. The text of the revised Agreement is not yet
available.
40 This is based on the assumption that the parent would not desire an
increase in the minority position by a further share offering.
41 Stikeman, H. H., Income Tax Act, p. 576.
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complies with the law, disclosure is not required. Now, disclosure is
a necessary prerequisite to compliance. 42 Again no definite answer
can be given; it is a question of public policy. Assuredly though, if the
shoe were on the other foot, cries of further American interference
would be rampant. Perhaps, of all the criticisms which have been
levied to date, this is the most serious as it indicates the utter futility
of the policy no matter how formulated. More charitably, it may
indicate that the listing requirement is all that is feasibly enforceable.
V
Having considered the defects as to form and content, the writer
would now like to discuss the wisdom of the amendment. Numerous
arguments have been proferred in its favour. They are as follows:
1. As the position of American capital becomes even more dominant,
the Canadian economy will become more and more integrated with
that of the United States. Continuing integration could lead to
complete economic domination and the loss of political indepen-
dence.43
2. In some circumstances, the best interests of Canada might not be
exactly the same as the best interests of the shareholders of a
foreign parent company with subsidiaries in Canada, for example
there might be less diligence in searching for new export markets
if the demand could be satisfied by the American parent."
3. Inter-company pricing policy might favour the parent rather than
the subsidiary, viz., low prices on supplies to the parent and high
prices for finished goods the other way with resultant inflation in
Canada.45
4. Canadian subsidiaries may be prohibited from buying their sup-
plies in the cheapest markets46 and forced to buy from the parent
corporation. The same has been said about possible competition in
common export markets.
5. The Canadian investor is not being given an opportunity to invest
in growth shares and thus is not allowed to share in the country's
prosperity. To the apologists who say that anyone interested can
invest in the shares of the parent, it is answered that this raises
problems of exchange rate fluctuation, increased taxation and the
loss of the 20% dividend tax credit available on dividends from
Canadian companies. 47
42 Heyding, L. F., Canadian Income Tax Amendments, 1964, Canadian
Tax Journal, vol. XIII, No. 3, p. 160.
43 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, final report, p. 390.
44 Tbid, p. 390.
45 bid, p. 391.
46 Canadian-American Committee, Policies and Practices of United States
Subsidiaries, p. 47.
47 If the policy is partially designed to affect Canadian exchange reserves,
a tax on retained surplus might be more effective.
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All of the above arguments may be true. Certainly they contain some
element of truth. But, in the absence of any factual basis, they carry
no more weight than a straw in the wind.48 Thus the Royal Commis-
sion on Canada's Economic Prospects expressed merely a personal
opinion when it said:
It seems to us that on the whole those Canadian subsidiaries of foreign
companies which have adopted the policies we are suggesting have made
a greater contribution to the Canadian economy in many ways than
others that have not such policies. Those that have done so appear to be
more interested and aggressive in developing their Canadian operations
and to be more aware of Canadian problems and viewpoints. There is no
way in which we can prove the general proposition scientifically, but it
is a definite impression we have gained as a result of our travels, hear-
ings and discussions. 49
While the writer does not dispute the right of a person or a group to
hold and express an opinion, it is felt that when an attempt to classify
companies as good or bad corporate citizens according to the degree
of their Canadian ownership becomes manifest in a legislative enact-
ment, it should be based on a sound legal or economic foundation. It
is not readily apparent that this is the case with section 139A. The
same is true of certain provisions of Bill C-123,50 for example section
36B of the Trust Companies Act which compels the directors of a
company to refuse the entry of a transfer of any share of the capital
stock to a non-resident if the total number of shares held by non-
residents exceeds twenty-five per cent of the total issued and out-
standing shares. An obvious and significant difference exists between
the two statutes. One is attempting to establish a Canadian position,
the other protecting an established situation. But what is the basic
policy? Is it motivated simply by a desire to discriminate? Is it
directed at all corporations or only those which are affluent and
powerful? No indication has been given. Little discussion has been
attendant on both pieces of legislation so that the public labours in
shadow. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made in a later section of
the paper to answer some of the problems.
The amendment to the Income Tax Act as it is presently formu-
lated encourages Canadians to take a minority position in American
concerns. When times are good or when honest corporations are in-
volved, a minority position is not dangerous. But such conditions are
not omnipresent and hence it is important to consider the available
protection. From a legal point of view, the leading case on share-
holders' meetings is Foss v. Harbottle5' which is authority for the
proposition that in all matters of internal management, the majority
is supreme subject to certain exceptions as summarized in Gray v.
Yellowknife Gold Mines Ltd. (No. 1). 52 Thus a majority cannot vali-
date an ultra vires act. It must act with bona fides and due considera-
48 It is to be hoped that the Royal Commission on Taxation will produce
some further information.
49 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, final report, p. 395.
50 Op cit., p. 1.
51 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
52 [1947] O.R. 928 (C.A.) at 963.
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tion for the opinion of dissentients and it must abide by all special
majority requirements.5 3 It is evident that the protection is circum-
scribed and it is unlikely that an action would lie where the parent,
in a general meeting, caused the subsidiary to forego some antici-
pated profit or expansion.54 For this answer, one must turn to the
jurisprudence of parent-subsidiary relations which is wholly unde-
veloped in Canada. In general, any conclusions can only be based on
tentative analogies drawn from the American and English experience.
In the United States, a fiduciary relationship is imposed upon
a majority shareholder and minority shareholders are permitted to
sue the majority for violation of the obligation on a majority's part
to exercise its power of control fairly. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,55 upheld
a suit by the minority shareholders of the Houston Texas Railway
Company against the Southern Pacific for violation of its fiduciary
duty as ultimate majority shareholder even though it acted through
yet another subsidiary. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that minority
shareholders are entitled to individual redress against wrongful injury
of their interest by a majority shareholder.5 6 One author suggests
that the Court will offer relief from majority approval of corporate
action although the tests of when such relief will be granted are not
uniform throughout the individual states.57 However, it would seem
that in most jurisdictions, the test is one of "fairness" to the minority
shareholder. The American Bar Association Model Corporations Act
makes provisions for this fiduciary duty.5 8
In England, the recent case of Scottish Cooperative Wholesale
Society Ltd. v. Myer 9 is interesting as it throws a more direct light
on the relationship between a parent and its subsidiary. There, a com-
pany (the subsidiary) was formed with a majority of the shares
held by the parent and a minority held by shareholders who managed
the business. When the minority had outlived their usefulness, the
parent caused their nominee directors to play a passive role and do
nothing to promote the interests of the subsidiary and in fact the
parent withheld from the subsidiary its supply of necessary raw
materials by quoting uneconomical prices. Meanwhile, it set up its
own division to carry on the same business and supplied it with raw
materials at the normal prices. 60
An application was brought by the minority shareholders under
section 210 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 6' to wind up the
53 Fraser and Stewart, Company Law of Canada, p. 677.
54 This view is buttressed by the recent case of Fallis and Deacon v.
United Fuel Investments Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 205.
55 250 U.S. 483.
56 Ibid, p. 78.
57 Hornstein, G. D., Corporation Law and Practice, vol. 2, p. 363.
58 Op cit., vol. 1, p. 13.
59 [1959] A.C. 324.
60 In any event, the case would not be covered by the exception to Foss
v. Harbottle.
61 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 38.
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subsidiary and for an order requiring the parent to purchase the.
minority position at a price reflecting the value of the shares prior
to their devaluation as a result of the parent's conduct. It must be
remembered that this case dealt with a statutory right which is not
applicable in Canada and there is no provision in our law which
affords a minority shareholder the relief sought in this case. How-
ever, in dealing with the parent-subsidiary relationship, the House of
Lords adopted the view of the Lord President of the First Division
of the Court of Session when he said:
... the truth is that, whenever a subsidiary is formed as in this case with
an independent minority of shareholders, the parent company must, if it
is engaged in the same class of business, accept, as a result of having
formed such a subsidiary, an obligation so to conduct what are in a sense
its own affairs as to deal fairly with its subsidiary.62
Lord Keith adopted this statement and expanded it by saying:
Conducting what are in a sense its own affairs may amount to miscon-
ducting the affairs of the subsidiary.63
Lord Denning in his judgment64 also reaffirmed the view of the Lord
President, that their Lordships were concerned with the manner in
which the affairs of the subsidiary were being conducted, that is,
with the conduct of those in control of its affairs and stated that if
the nominee directors or the shareholders behind them conduct the
affairs of the company in a manner oppressive to the other share-
holders, the Court will bring an end to the oppression under section
210. In conclusion it would seem that unless the American authorities
are relied upon or an analogy is drawn to the English statute, the
Canadian minority shareholders do not have a cause of action
against the American parent for failure to pursue a corporate oppor-
tunity. With respect to an action against the subsidiary itself, this
seems unlikely since any damages which were recovered would be
paid by the subsidiary in effect to itself as a minority shareholders'
derivative action is only one which the company itself would have.
Nevertheless, the English and American experience may still act as
a deterent to the unbridled use of its corporate power by the American
parent.
With regard to the legal liability of the directors of the sub-
sidiary viv A vis the company, the leading Canadian case is Cook v.
Deeks65 which was an appeal taken from the Supreme Court of
Ontario to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In that case,
the company was incorporated to undertake the construction of
railway lines for the C.P.R.. The company successfully bid on and
constructed certain lines and eventually, two directors of the company
obtained a further contract in their own names to the exclusion of
the company. An action was instituted by the minority shareholder
to recover the profit made by the directors. It was held that if the
62 1954 S.C. 381, 391.
63 Supra, footnote 59 at 362.
64 bid, p. 364.
65 [1916] 1 A.C. 554.
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contract in question was entered into under such circumstances
that the directors could not retain the benefits of it for themselves,
then it belonged in equity to the company and ought to have been
dealt with as an asset of the company. In the same way, if the
directors had acquired for themselves property or rights which they
must be regarded as holding on behalf of the company, a resolution
that the rights of the company should be disregarded in the matter
would amount to forfeiting the interest of the minority shareholders
in favour of the majority, and that, by votes of those interested in
acquiring the property for themselves. The Judicial Committee held
that such use of voting power has never been sanctioned by the
Courts and held that the directors were liable to the company for
the profits. Obiter, their Lordships stated that if the view were
taken that in the circumstances the directors had exercised discretion
or decided on a matter of policy, different results would have ensued.
However on the facts, they could not accept such a conclusion.
Although the case dealt with the relationship between the
directors and the company, a possible extension might be made by
replacing the directors with the parent company for whom they act.
In such a case, if the parent company instructed its nominees not
to act or to act in a positive manner so as to exclude the subsidiary,
both the directors and the parent might be required to account for
the profits. This assumption does not have the force of law in
Canada, but if the Court were willing to impose liability, such an end
could be attained by the extension of Cook v. Deeks. In any event,
the directors of the subsidiary are in a precarious position since
notwithstanding the parent-subsidiary relationship, there is an un-
disputed fiduciary relationship imposed on the directors to act in the
best interests of the subsidiary.
In the Scottish Cooperative case referred to above, Lord Keith,
in dealing with the role played by the directors of the subsidiary who
were nominees of the parent, stated66 that he could not but think
that where directors, having power to save the company, lie back
and do nothing, that they are not conducting the affairs of the com-
pany, but in reality, they are conducting the affairs of the company
in breach of their duty as directors. His Lordship drew an analogy
between the parent-subsidiary relationship and the relationship be-
tween partners, stating that if one partner operates a business com-
petitive with the partnership without the knowledge and consent
of the others, he is acting contrary to good faith. Similarly, Lord
Denning, stated that the nominee directors probably thought their
just duty was to the parent, but in this they were wrong and that by
subordinating the interest of the subsidiary, they conducted the com-
pany's affairs in a manner oppressive to the other shareholders. Nor
did the fact that the directors were only guilty of non-feasance carry
any weight. In his opinion, oppression could exist merely because
66 Id. at 363.
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the directors did nothing in the subsidiary's interest when they were
under a duty to act positively.
In conclusion, the above represents a rather extreme case of
parent-subsidiary conflict. Also Cook v. Deeks has real reference
only to personal profit by the directors. Nevertheless, it is a definite
possibility that they would be rendered liable. As Lord Denning
stated:
So long as there is harmony between the parent and subsidiary and theirinterests are not in conflict the nominee directors could do their duty to
both companies without embarrassment. But so soon as the interests of
the two Companies were in conflict the nominee directors were placed In
an impossible position.67
Nevertheless, these conclusions are to a large degree speculative. The
fact remains that a right without a remedy is inconsequential. On
the supposition that the alleged disadvantages which stem from
foreign ownership are valid, they are not adumbrated by merely
amending the Income Tax Act. For greater certainty, an alteration
of the federal Companies Act68 is also required in order to protect
those who have become minority shareholders. 69
VI
As noted in Part V, the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic
Prospects averted to a number of unfavourable aspects which they
thought flowed from foreign ownership of Canadian industry. Un-
fortunately, their hypotheses were purely conjectural in nature and
completely devoid of any statistical foundation. For this reason,
two recent publications-The Exports of American-Ouned Enter-
prises in Canada by Mr. A. E. Safarian7 0 and Policies and Practices
of United States Subsidiaries in Canada71 by the Canadian-American
Committee are of extreme importance. With regard to the latter,
their purpose was to remedy the lack of current statistics which had
proven a bar to any sound quantitative analysis of the problem. To
effect this end, 47 firms were interviewed. Apparently, these in-
cluded all the relatively large companies operating in the Canadian
manufacturing and resource industries. Nineteen of the 47 had
some degree of Canadian equity participation ranging from a very
small percentage to over 50 per cent. Unfortunately, the results
were not tabulated so that the findings are quite imprecise. Also,
the results are to some degree biased as only those questions to which
favourable replies could be given would be answered. Nevertheless,
as a counterbalance to the existing generalizations, they are informa-
tive and valuable.
67 Id. at 366.
68 R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.
69 This has not been done by the proposed bill to amend the Companies
Act now before the Senate.
70 Presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Associa-
tion, Boston, December 28, 1963.
71 Lindeman, J., and Armstrong, D., PoZicies and Practices of United
States Subsidiaries in Canada.
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(a) Some of those interviewed thought that a minority interest
strengthened the Canadian management's hand whenever there was
an apparent conflict between the parent and the subsidiary. How-
ever, it seems that a larger number felt that so long as the parent
had actual voting control, policies in which the parent had a pre-
dominant interest would never be compromised in favour of the
subsidiary, no matter how large the minority holding.72
(b) Of those who took the former view, apparently all thought
that a minority Canadian equity participation was correlated directly
with a greater responsiveness to the Canadian national interest.
73
(c) Another point of view expressed by officers of companies
with a Canadian equity position was that some degree of ownership
was a Canadian moral right.74
On the other side, a number of unsupported opinions were
proferred, but of more than casual interest was that of an official
whose Canadian subsidiary had a very substantial minority participa-
tion. His position was that the subsidiary is at a very serious dis-
advantage in vying with branches in the United States and with
wholly owned subsidiaries in other countries for the parent's atten-
tion. As stated in the report:
Why should the parent company devote time, talent, and other resources
to the Canadian operation for only a part of the profits when it can get
100% of it elsewhere?7 5
The argument could continue ad infinitum. The results of the study
are informative but on balance disappointing. Yet, they do represent
a first attempt at evaluating in a meaningful form the underlying
factual and economic bases of the problem.
Safarian's article represents a more concrete, albeit narrower,
analysis of the same general problem. His purpose was to determine
whether American-owned firms as opposed to those with some degree
of Canadian ownership were less likely to export and in particular
to export to the United States. Approximately 227 Canadian firms
owned by non-resident Americans in the manufacturing, mining and
petroleum industries were questioned with a response rate based on
total assets equal to 40 per cent. Although subject to the usual
qualifications regarding private surveys, the results indicated that
American ownership had little or no effect on export policy and
export volume.76 Understandably, the larger firms are apparently
more export orientated. 77 Seemingly, the paper has laid to rest the
myth that ownership and exports are in some way related, but
nonetheless, it would be interesting to see a government sponsored
study which dealt with the subject on the basis of a degree of Cana-
72 !mid, p. 26.
73 !bid, p. 27.
74 ibd, p. 28.
75 mid, p. 28.
76 Safarian, Op. cit., p.8.
77 Since their production exceeds domestic demand.
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dian ownership. Rumour has it that such results may emanate from
the Carter commission but until they exist, the legislators are
operating in a vacuum.
VII
The subject matter of this paper has been the analysis of a
current and contentious Canadian problem. However, the desire for
a greater Canadian equity participation has its roots in a much
larger problem namely the search by Canadians for a national
identity. As such, it contains an emotional content which cannot be
rationally evaluated and which invariably colours any effort at
reasoned criticism. So too, it can become a political football and
thereby, there is a tendency that those elements which are amenable
to logical scrutiny will be disregarded in the harangue of the hustings.
It is the lawyer's role to prevent this. Pursuant thereto, the writer
submits that certain conclusions may be drawn which will form a
basis of departure for future research.
1. To date, the two enactments of section 139A have cultivated
an aura of uncertainty, the first by its sophomoric draftsmanship, the
second by its complexity. Businessmen are entitled to a clear exposi-
tion of government policy rather than what presently appears to be
a hesitant white paper. Until this defect is cured, the success of
the policy will of necessity be limited.
2. It is a truism that there are only two ways to move a man
- by pulling or pushing. In the absence of compulsion, a more
attractive incentive is required than the present 5 per cent. with-
holding tax differential. Given the American tax legislation, the
effect is nugatory. As a recommended alternative, the writer suggests
at least the abolition of all withholding tax for those corporations
which comply.
3. At present, no effective remedy is available to the Canadian
shareholder who follows the Government's admonition to accept a
minority position. Nor does a remedy seem to be foreseeable in the
immediate future. Such a deficiency is both inconsistent and
lamentable.
4. As yet, no extensive research has been undertaken which
would determine whether the evils which the Gordon Commission
referred to exist or whether they are merely delusions engendered by
Canada's schizophrenic national personality. 78 If they do, it is
certain that by itself section 139A is not a panacea. Perhaps more
charitably, one should note the words of the Canadian-American
Committee:
It might be legitimately doubted that the ... action will necessarily
help to attain the goal in all cases; also, it may be found that sometimes
the goal could as well be reached by other means. Nevertheless, ...
78 Such analysis that has been done indicates that the latter is the cor-
rect view.
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minority ownership by Canadians is one of several means towards an
end.79
Parent-subsidiary conflicts will not be exorcised by the present legis-
lation. It is only to be hoped that it may give rise to a greater
appreciation of Canadian sentiments.
5. One is still left to wonder whether the best available method
has been adopted. Indeed, are there others?8 0 Conformity to the
legislation does not give birth to a "good" corporate citizen and vice
versa. Many companies with substantial Canadian ownership are not
Canadian oriented. In addition, Safarian's paper indicates that the
larger the company, the less may be the evil.81 Yet, no indication
has been given as to whether the policy is directed at the giants or
the pygmies. On the basis of the pending trust and insurance legis-
lation,82 one might legitimately suppose the former. As a matter of
pure academic interest, it would be interesting to know; as a matter
of sound policy, it is essential.
In summary, ignorance forbids the conclusion that the policy
objective of section 139A must forever remain as an exercise in
futility. However, at the date of writing, it would be incorrect to
say that the legislation has reached Olympian heights of effectiveness.
For those who approve of the legislation in principle if not in sub-
stance, the words of M/fr. Dalton Robertson are consoling:
Certainly there are no quick or easy solutions-as the present govern-
ment has discovered to its pain and chagrin. But the fact remains that
Canada, for the first time in the post war years, has a government that
is attempting to make basic changes in the difficult and sensitive area of
this country's commercial life.8 3
The next move will be eagerly awaited!
79 Lindeman, Op cit., p. 23.
80 A restriction on American investment in Canada imposed by the United
States authorities might cause less reaction.81 Safarian, Op. cit., p. 39.
82 Safarian, Op. cit., p. 1.
83 Canadian Tax Foundation, 1963 Conference, The Importance of Being
Canadian, p. 19.
